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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the Persistence Question about cities, that is, what is necessary 
and sufficient for two cities existing at different times to be numerically identical. 
We first show that we can possibly put an end to the existence of a city in a number 
of ways other than by physically destroying it, which reveals the metaphysics of 
cities to be partly different from that of ordinary objects. Then we focus in particular 
on the commonly perceived vulnerability of cities to imaginary relocation; and we 
make the hypothesis that cities do have among their essential properties that of 
being surrounded by a specific geographical context. Finally we investigate the pos-
sibility that a city can survive relocation in virtue of the capacity of its geographical 
context to survive it in the first place. We suggest that city contexts may not be 
essentially context-dependent in turn, and outline a possible description of the cri-
teria for their persistence over time. 
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1. The Persistence Question about Cities 
Generally speaking, the Persistence Question is a question about what is necessary 
and sufficient for two cities existing at different times to be numerically identical. 
Rising the Persistence Question about cities amounts to asking what is necessary 
and sufficient for a past (or future) city to exist now. 
Indeed, to raise the Persistence Question about cities may appear pointless 
to many people. Firstly—the objection goes—it is very infrequent that a city may 
stop to exist. Cities normally persist for a much longer time than people. 
Moreover, they tend to stop to exist in connection to the collapse of a society, an 
empire or a nation. But these kinds of events are more and more rare in our global 
world. Thus, cities (differently from villages) can be supposed to stop to exist in 
the next future at even a smaller rate than in the past of human history. Secondly, 
when a city happens to stop to exist, there is no doubt about what has happened. 
In other words, events counting as a city stopping to exist tend to be highly 
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recognisable, in virtue of their necessarily consisting in the physical destruction 
of the city itself. Thus raising the Persistence Question about cities cannot be a 
useful philosophical activity. 
We rebut that reasoning about the Persistence Question about x is always an 
excellent way to reveal what our concept of x is like. In fact, by exploring how x 
survives or not different kinds of change (no matter that some of them are not 
technically producible), we cast light on the most hidden characteristics of our 
very conception of x, metaphysically speaking. In particular, we can use thought 
experiments in order to investigate how, according to our best1 intuitions and 
judgements, a city can survive some kinds of events and cannot survive others. 
This discloses what properties are constitutive of a city, and what properties are 
merely contingent. So thought experiments about cities reveal cities’ metaphysical 
secrets. And increased awareness of the metaphysical nature of a city—how 
different it is with respect to that of ordinary objects; what kinds of items a city is 
dependent of; what kinds of items, on the contrary, do not ground its existence—
may in turn affect our way of reflecting about cities, as well as governing, 
planning, bettering, living them. 
Of course resorting to using thought experiments to explore how cities can 
stop to exist may reveal disappointing if a city could stop to exist only as an effect 
of a physical destruction of all or at least the majority of its parts (buildings, 
streets, and so on). Yet it seems to us that this is not the case. 
 
2. How We Can Possibly Put an End to the Existence of a City 
other than by Physically Destroying It 
Apparently, we can possibly put an end to the existence of a city other than by 
physically destroying it. This imaginary exploration may reveal that a city is 
subject to special persistence conditions that are partially different from those 
holding for ordinary objects. 
A first scenario is the one in which the city is made inhabitable, e.g. by 
flooding it with water or exposing it to high levels of radioactive contamination. 
Yet it might be argued that, should Paris become inhabitable, it would remain 
Paris (at least during the first days after the change). We would not say that Paris 
no longer exists, but rather that Paris persists as an inhabitable city. Likewise, in 
case Manuel Fangio’s 1956 Ferrari 290 MM just is made undrivable—e.g. by 
making its steering wheel stuck or extremely hot—we would not say that it no 
longer exists, but only that it persists as an undrivable car. On the other hand, one 
may parallel the contemplation of the inhabitable (and uninhabited) Paris with 
that of the physically intact, recently dead body of John.2 Both may seem to be 
 
1 Not every intuition we may have will be used to determine whether x survives or not dif-
ferent kinds of change. For example, after inspecting its logical consequences, we may 
decide to drop intuition N because the rival intuition N', whose content is that the logical 
consequence L of N is untenable, is stronger than N. 
2 As a comparative basis for exploring the Persistence Question about architectural entities 
and cities, we won’t turn our nose up at making frequent use of the Persistence Question 
about persons. The comparison among architectural entities and cities, on one side, and 
persons, on the other side, may seem improper, if for no other reason than that a different 
class of items exists that appears more ontologically similar to the class of architectural 
entities and to the class of cities—i.e. the class of ordinary objects. We may expect the 
metaphysical properties of a cathedral, or a city, to be more akin to those of an armchair 
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persisting right now. But just as we go beyond visual appearance in the case of 
John—and admit that John has ceased to exist when he died a few hours ago, no 
matter that his dead body still persists—similarly we may want to say that Paris 
has ceased to exist when it has become uninhabited a few days ago, no matter 
that “its dead body” is still here. Indeed, we use to speak of “dead cities” in such 
cases.3 Another point in common is that both the corpse and the inhabitable city 
are inexorably decaying since the occurring of the event making them dead and 
uninhabited, respectively—so that the illusion of the persistence of Paris and John 
will be rapidly blown away. 
A second scenario is the one in which the entire population of the city is 
removed and substituted with a new one, coming from a very different part of the 
world, speaking a different language and maybe unaware of the existence—or at 
least of the main characteristics—of that city until the transfer (after which, 
however, the city is named exactly as it was before). Suppose that we substitute 
the entire “Parisian” population of the actual Paris (4,366,961 persons within the 
“inner ring” according to the NSEE 2008 census) with the same number of 
persons coming from Shanghai. Would Paris still be Paris after the change? The 
question is stimulating and highly disputable. If one embraces some form of the 
 
than to yours and ours. Nonetheless we think that using persons as a comparative basis 
can be powerful and fruitful. One of the reasons is that, while the reasonable responses to 
the Persistence Question about architectural entities and cities outnumber those about or-
dinary objects, there is an almost one-to-one correspondence (mutatis mutandis) between 
the former and those about persons; and the arguments in favour and against each response 
are interestingly comparable. Secondly, when we care about the persistence of an ordinary 
object, we frequently are concerned about preserving it merely as a member of some cate-
gory (e.g. the basic level category) rather than as a specific individual item. For instance, 
when we care about the persistence of an armchair, a refrigerator or a pair of glasses, we 
commonly are only interested in that they persist as members of the set of (comfortable) 
armchairs, (serviceable) refrigerators and (usable) glasses respectively, while the problem 
whether they also persist as the specific individual objects they were may easily remain out 
of the focus of our attention. When we deal with persons, the situation is very different: 
our caring about the persistence of a person is most of the times identical to our caring 
about the persistence of that specific individual person. Therefore if one is interested in 
posing the Persistence Question about individual buildings, such as the church of Saint-
Germain-des-Prés, or about a city, such as Los Angeles, a comparison with the Persistence 
Question about persons seems more productive. 
3 Of course our having recourse to the Persistence Question about persons does not require 
cities to be persons or even organisms. Speaking of “dead cities” presupposes regarding 
cities as organisms, but we just take this to be a promising metaphor among many, like for 
example those of cities as machines, brains or political systems (Gerber and Patterson 
2013; Nientied 2016). We do not agree with Varzi (forthcoming), however, that—as robust 
as the analogy among cities and organisms might be—it falls in that cities do not normally 
“die”. We would rather say that cities seem to “live” longer than any organism we know, 
and to withstand kinds of events that would kill any organism we know. Still we can im-
agine some combinations of events that would “kill” a city. Varzi writes: “Think of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki. We dropped nuclear bombs on those cities. The aftermath photos are 
horrifying: all those buildings reduced to rubble, all those people vaporized. A devastating 
tragedy of incomprehensible scale. Yet the cities survived. Everything was rebuilt—homes, 
schools, temples, bridges, theaters.” We reply that Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have 
survived not the nuclear bombs if, for example, all human survivors had moved to a dif-
ferent city, and no building was ever rebuilt. Therefore cities can “die”, and even do “die”. 
Only, their “death conditions” are different from those of organisms. 
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Actor-Network Theory, for example (e.g. Lees 2001; Jenkins 2002), it will be 
natural to conclude that Paris is no longer Paris, since the identity of a city is 
considered as fixed by the complex of attitudes, experiences, intentions and 
emotions gravitating to (indeed inside) it, as realised in the minds of their 
inhabitants, as well as by the attributing to it of certain functions, significance, 
aesthetic value, and so on—all factors which cannot but dramatically vary 
through sets of completely different populations.4 On the other hand, it is easy to 
argue in favour of the opposite conclusion. It is easy to argue, for example, that 
Paris has been subject to a real and full change in population from 19th century to 
today, and this has not even threatened its persistence through time. Of course, 
this population change has been continuous and gradual rather than sudden and 
abrupt—but why should continuous population changes lack the power to 
threaten the identity of cities if sudden ones do possess it? And, if we imagine to 
suddenly substitute the 19th century Parisian population with the present one 
within the 19th century Paris—would this sudden population change be lethal to 
Paris as well? We assume that the majority of us would doubt it would be so. 
Another possible way to put an end to the existence of a city could consist in 
destroying, removing or saliently transforming a certain number of its most well-
known landmarks and monuments. In a sense, this may be considered as an act 
that physically destroys some proper parts of the city. As we are exploring the 
ways in which we can possibly put an end to the existence of a city other than by 
physically destroying it, this kind of change may simply fall outside of our target. 
Yet it is intriguing to ask whether Paris would cease to be Paris should we 
eliminate the Eiffel Tower—we guess that this would not be sufficient to menace 
Paris’ persistence; and, to ask when we would start to hesitate among “yes” and 
“no” while we add to the list (the elimination of) the Pont Neuf, the Notre Dame 
Cathedral, the Conciergerie, the Saint-Germain-des-Prés church, the Louvre 
Museum, and so on. We assume most people will agree that, whatever the point 
along this continuum at which we start being uncertain whether Paris has ceased 
to exist, overall a smaller part of Paris will have been destroyed than that that it is 
necessary to destroy as a whole before we start to be equally uncertain about Paris’ 
persistence if we simply proceed by destroying one building after another from 
East to West, or from North to South, or by chance. Such a comparison may 
reveal how dependent a city’s identity is from its landmarks and top tourist 
attractions. Interestingly, we may discover that the architectural works and spots 
that are most relevant for the city’s persistence according to its inhabitants do not 
match those which are considered as the top tourist attractions. 
Another fascinating scenario is the one in which a city is split into two or 
more new cities—or, it is merged to another city. It seems to us that it is disputable 
whether a city can survive these kinds of change. In particular, while someone 
may want to presume that, when a city T is split into n cities, one (and no more 
than one) in the n cities must be numerically identical to T, we want to deny such 
a presumption. 
To sum up, there are at least four ways of possibly putting an end to the 
existence of a city other than by physically destroying it. The first way consists in 
 
4 The reader should be aware that the supporter of the Actor-Network Theory may hold 
that Paris can cease to be Paris also as an effect of some change in the network of relation-
ships lesser than a population change—such as e.g. a change in people’s beliefs, desires, 
abilities or social status, or in their mere spatial distribution. 
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making it inhabitable, and rests on the idea that a necessary condition for 
something to be a city is possessing a population. Thus—unlike the other three 
ways—making city T cease to exist through making it inhabitable requires making 
T cease to be a city at all. The second way consists in producing a sudden and 
total change in the population of the city. The idea is that a city can survive 
sudden partial changes or slow total changes, but not sudden total changes in 
population. If the latter occur, however, a city will continue to be a city: it will 
just cease to be that city. The third way consists in destroying, removing or 
saliently transforming a certain number of its landmarks and monuments. The 
underlying idea is that there is a critical mass of destroyed landmarks traditionally 
identified as distinctive of city T beyond which city T loses one of its essential 
properties. The fourth way consists in splitting the city into two or more cities, or, 
by merging it to another city. It relies on two general principles. The first principle 
says that, if city T exists at t1 and cities U and V exist at t2; and U is numerically 
different from V; and the only three possibilities are that (i) T at t1 is the same city 
as U at t2, or (ii) T at t1 is the same city as V at t2, or (iii) T has ceased to exist at t2; 
and we cannot non-arbitrarily determine which of U and V at t2 is the same city 
as T at t1 despite knowing all the relevant facts, then (iii) is the case. The second 
principle says that, if cities T and W exist at t1 and city Z exists at t2; and T is 
numerically different from W; and the only three possibilities are that (i) Z at t2 is 
the same city as T at t1 and W has ceased to exist at t2, or (ii) Z at t2 is the same 
city as W at t1 and T has ceased to exist at t2, or (iii) Z at t2 is a brand new city and 
both T and W have ceased to exist at t2; and we cannot non-arbitrarily determine 
which of T and W at t1 is the same city as Z at t2 despite knowing all the relevant 
facts, then (iii) is the case. Note, however, that in the latter situation it is not 
necessary that (iii) be the case for T to have ceased to exist at t2, because T will 
have ceased to exist at t2 also if we can determine that (ii) rather than (i) is the 
case. 
What can be said in conclusion is that, at worst, it is open to question whether 
we can put an end to the existence of a city other than by physically destroying it. 
Moreover, in many scenarios the intuitions and the arguments supporting a 
positive answer do seem no less powerful than their rivals.5 However, there is 
 
5 Interestingly, one anonymous reviewer suggested that an additional way to put an end to 
the existence of a city other than by physically destroying it could be by fiat—e.g. by mak-
ing it become an independent state, or several villages from an administrative point of 
view. We are not convinced, however, that a mere fiat would have the force to make a city 
cease to exist. Accordingly the identity conditions over time for cities are relevantly differ-
ent from those for mere institutional entities, because we can normally make an institu-
tional entity cease to exist by simply destroying its status by a fiat (Jansen 2008). One could 
object that a specific fiat by the government or the safety authorities (“From this day for-
ward, this city is off limits”) can make a city cease to exist by making it inhabitable in the 
first place, no matter that no environmental condition would actually prevent it from being 
populated. But it seems to us that, also in such a case, the fiat alone is barely sufficient to 
make the city inhabitable in practice, and some supplementary physical factor is required—
if only the deployment of law enforcement resources to make the ban respected. Following 
Weber (1921), one may suggest that a city is a space essentially characterised by the perfor-
mance of some economic functions (consumption, production, and trade), so that the col-
lapse of these functions would make the city cease to exist. Again, we doubt that this is 
true. We can imagine Paris or New Delhi to persist also in a scenario where their traditional 
economic functions are lost or have dramatically changed. One further interesting question 
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another important scenario to be explored: relocation—the case study we want to 
focus on in the present paper. 
 
3. Relocation 
It is intriguing to ask what happens to a city if we relocate it, that is, if we 
meticulously dismantle and rebuild it in a different place on Earth, paying 
attention to reassemble all of its parts exactly as they were before. Imagine that 
no proper part of the city is physically destroyed in the operation, and that not 
only we use exactly the same set of physical materials—such as bricks, reinforcing 
steels, and so on—but also have all of them playing exactly the same roles. For 
the argument’s clarity, suppose that also its inhabitants are equally relocated so 
that there is no population change—otherwise you may be observing the 
metaphysical effects of a population change rather than those of a mere 
relocation. We assume that most people will judge that no city can survive this 
kind of change. One may speculate that the reason resides in the resulting climate 
change, or perhaps in the change in the quantity and quality of the sunlight. But 
again—once we concede that the new location, however distant from the original 
one, involves no significant change for climate and sunlight—we posit that most 
people will maintain their opinion. It seems that relocation by itself is perceived 
as a serious threat to the identity of a city. The relocated item would still be a city, 
of course; but it would be not the same city. Suppose that we try to relocate Paris 
in Nevada, USA. The majority’s estimation is that Paris would not survive such 
a relocation. But why? 
We make the hypothesis that the reason is that cities do have among their 
essential properties that of being surrounded by a specific geographical context. 
Relocating a city—no matter that its population, climate and relationship with 
the sunlight are preserved—entails altering this essential property, hence its being 
lethal to the city’s persistence. In other words, cities are constitutively relational 
items, and cannot survive the deprivation of their external context—i.e. the 
physical geographical environment surrounding them, as constituted by material 
entities (such as woods, hills, mountains, roads, villages, other cities, the sea) and 
the properties exemplified by them. Therefore, cities turn out to be metaphysically 
different from ordinary objects and persons, whose identity is typically untouched 
by relocation. Rather they are similar to geographical entities such as mountains 
and rivers, architectural entities such as the church of Saint-Germain-des-Prés in 
Paris, site-specific works of art such as Tilted Arc by Richard Serra (Kwon 2002; 
Bacchini 2017), 6  location-specific food products like geographical indications 
(Borghini 2015: 728, 735), some specific culinary works (Bacchini 2018) and—
surprisingly—nano-objects, whose essential characteristics seem to depend on 
 
is: can a city that has ceased to exist start to exist again—or, resurrect? If the answer is ‘yes’, 
can it do so only within a certain period of time? And, are we more inclined to acknowledge 
the capacity to resurrect to those cities that have ceased to exist without being physically 
destroyed (provided that we believe it possible for a city to cease to exist without being 
physically destroyed in the first place)? 
6 In 1985, Richard Serra stated that his 120-foot, Cor-Ten steel sculpture Tilted Arc (1981) 
located in Federal Plaza, New York City, was “commissioned and designed for one par-
ticular site: Federal Plaza. It is a site-specific work and as such not to be relocated. To 
remove the work is to destroy the work” (Kwon 2002: 12).  
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their environment, in virtue of the unusual ratio between bulk and surface (e.g. 
Bensaude-Vincent 2013). 
We do not intend to deny that cities may have some other essential 
properties, and that some other changes different from relocation may turn out to 
be lethal to their persistence accordingly. But among their essential properties 
there is the property of being surrounded by a specific geographical context. We 
call this position ‘contextual essentialism’. According to contextual essentialism, 
it is essential to Paris to be surrounded by the woods of Île-de-France; it is essential 
to Rome that all its ancient consular roads connect it to those quaint villages and 
that typical countryside; and it is essential to Lisbon to lie on the Tagus river 
estuary.7 
According to the stronger version of contextual essentialism, it is essential to 
a city not simply the property of being surrounded by a specific external context, 
but even that of being surrounded by a specific external context in the specific way 
it is surrounded by it, where a “specific way of being surrounded by a context” is 
characterised, among other things, by all the spatial relations holding among the 
item and the context. According to the stronger version, then, a city may be 
threatened also by a relocation consisting in a 180-degree rotation so that the 
district that previously faced the sea now faces the mountains, and viceversa. 
We are aware that cities’ inability to survive relocation can be explained also 
by saying that it is essential to a city to be located exactly where it is located, that 
is, in the particular part of Earth’s surface it occupies. This formulation may seem 
to pick out the same essential property we refer to, but a more careful look tells 
us otherwise. Indeed, you can imagine to dramatically change the context a city 
is surrounded by while leaving the city in the particular part of Earth’s surface it 
occupies. On the other hand, it is equally easy to imagine moving the city away 
from the particular part of Earth’s surface it occupies together with its context—
which would apparently leave its context untouched. 
Once we acknowledge that we can imaginarily manipulate either one 
property without affecting the other, we must of course verify the change of which 
property precisely is detrimental to the city’s persistence. It seems to us that—if 
we imagine relocating Rome together with its broader geographical context (say, 
the whole Italian peninsula)—the relocated city would be easily judged to remain 
Rome. By contrast, if we envisage to leave Rome in the particular part of Earth’s 
surface it occupies while substituting the whole Italian peninsula with—say—the 
Honshu island (the largest and most populous island of Japan), it is likely that the 
majority of people would value the transformation to be lethal to Rome. We 
conclude that the essential property should be correctly identified as the property 
of being surrounded by a specific external context. On the same line of reasoning, 
Bacchini (2017) has argued that most architectural objects (typically, buildings) 
are such that to change their position would be to alter one of their essential 
properties, where this essential property should be identified as the property of 
being surrounded by a specific external context, rather than the property of being 
located in a particular part of Earth’s surface. In a sense, the present paper should 
 
7 The size of cities’ geographical contexts can vary depending on many different factors. 
We will assume, however, that no city has a geographical context so small as to be negli-
gible, and, on the other hand, that no city has a geographical context so wide as to corre-
spond to a very large area of Earth such as, for example, a continent. 
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be seen as an attempt to extend to cities Bacchini’s view of the explanation of 
buildings’ metaphysical vulnerability to relocation. 
We do not want to deny that some people will have an intuition requiring 
that the essential property should be identified as the property of the city’s being 
located in the particular part of Earth’s surface it occupies. Call this position 
‘locative essentialism’ (Casati and Varzi 2000). Basically, a locative essentialist 
holds that it is essential to a city to be located in the area of land it rises up in. 
Indeed, a locative essentialist may also want to express her position by saying that 
it is essential to a city to be located in a specific geographical region. But the latter 
formulation can also be seen as expressing the view we embrace—i.e. contextual 
essentialism—provided that we take a geographical region R to be identical with 
a set of features (typically specifying landforms) instantiable by one or more areas 
of land. If, on the contrary, we interpret a geographical region R to be identical 
with one particular area of land, then the statement according to which it is 
essential to a city to be located in a specific geographical region does count as a 
declaration of locative essentialism. But note that locative essentialism seems to 
be no other than a form of mereological essentialism after all (Chisholm 1973), 
since it can be reformulated as the view that among the essential parts of a city 
there are some that cannot ever be relocated—such as the particular area of a 
tectonic plate on Earth’s lithosphere on which the city rises up, and perhaps 
others, like for example the “piece of sky” above it.8 Although arguing against 
mereological essentialism is beyond the aims of the present paper, we just want 
to remark that it is a very problematic view, entailing many conclusions 
contrasting our common intuition (van Inwagen 2006)—especially so if applied 
to cities. 
 
4. Adequate Criteria for the Persistence of Geographical Con-
texts 
It seems to us that contextual essentialism must be coupled with adequate criteria 
for the persistence of geographical contexts, that is, with criteria that do not entail 
that a geographical context cannot survive any destruction or major change 
affecting one of its proper parts. Such combination is necessary in order to prevent 
a major objection, according to which the geographical context of every city we 
can think about—Paris, Rome, Lisbon, London—has importantly physically 
changed in the last centuries: villages have been created, houses have been built, 
forests have been destroyed, lakes have been drained, and so on. Provided that an 
essential property of the thirteenth century Paris is its being surrounded by its 
specific thirteenth century context (as we claim), positing that a geographical 
context cannot survive any destruction or major change affecting one of its proper 
parts entails that a city cannot survive it either. In other words, all the relevant 
physical changes from its thirteenth century to the present context would 
necessarily prove lethal to Paris. But just as Paris has survived the transformation 
affecting Paris itself, it has also survived the significant alteration of its context 
during the last centuries. So one that wants to embrace contextual essentialism 
must be prepared to provide criteria for the persistence of a city’s context that can 
 
8 Nonetheless one could question the idea that the particular area of a tectonic plate on 
Earth’s lithosphere on which it rises up, or the piece of sky above it, are parts of the city. 
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prevent the disastrous conclusion that a city ceases to exist as soon as just one 
proper part of its context changes. 
One possibility is modelling such criteria on the basis of how Parfit (1984) 
specified the psychological criterion for the Persistence Question about persons, 
according to which some kind of psychological relation is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a numerical identity among entities existing at different 
times to hold, in a case in which at least one of the entities is a person. On the 
psychological criterion, the correct view of the Persistence Question about 
persons is a reductionist view, because the fact of a person’s identity over time 
just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts that can be described 
in an impersonal way and do not presuppose the identity of that person or even 
its existence. 
The basis that Parfit takes for his own revision of the psychological criterion 
is Locke’s view, according to which, for a thing existing in the future to count as 
you existing in the future, it is necessary and sufficient that that thing has your 
memories, your beliefs, your passions (although not necessarily all of your present 
memories, beliefs and passions), and some other mental states that you have now. 
In Parfit’s terms, it is necessary and sufficient that that thing is strongly 
psychologically connected with you now, where psychological connectedness is 
the holding of particular direct psychological connections (such as, the 
relationships among an experience and the memory of it, or among an intention 
and the action that follows from it, or among a desire existing at t1 and the same 
desire persisting at t2) and strong psychological connectedness is the holding of 
very many such connections. 
But the story cannot be that simple. First, Parfit adds the requirement that 
this psychological connectedness has not taken a “branching” form, holding 
between one persons and two different things. Second, as Reid first objected to 
Locke, identity is transitive, while psychological connectedness (whether it be 
strong or not) is not: I am sure that the one year old boy my parents took to Venice 
in 1972 is me, although I must admit that possibly no specific memory, belief or 
passion belonging to that boy has been inherited by me today. On Parfit’s revised 
Lockean view, P at t1 is the same person as Q at t2 if and only if (i) P is 
psychologically continuous with Q and (ii) psychological continuity has not taken 
a “branching” form, where psychological continuity is defined as the 
psychological relation realised by overlapping chains of strong psychological 
connectedness. Differently from psychological connectedness, psychological 
continuity is transitive. While we may doubt that there are some direct memory 
connections between me today and the one year old boy my parents took to 
Venice in 1972, we can agree that there are many overlapping chains of strong 
psychological connectedness between them. 
In analogy to Parfit’s version of the psychological criterion, we may say that 
X at t1 is the same city context as Y at t2 if and only if (i) X is persistentially 
continuous with Y and (ii) persistential continuity has not taken a “branching” 
form, where persistential continuity is defined as the relation realised by 
overlapping chains of strong persistential connectedness; in turn, persistential 
connectedness is the holding of particular connections realised by unproblematic 
instantiations of the relationship of identity over time of entities like forests, rivers, 
roads, houses and villages (such as, the relationships among a river yesterday and 
the same river persisting today, or among a small village on Monday and the same 
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small village persisting on Tuesday), and strong persistential connectedness is the 
holding of very many such connections.9 
On this view, a city context can remain the same context—i.e. persist 
through time—also if it is affected by continuous physical transformation—just 
as a person persists through time in spite of her incessantly psychologically 
changing. The idea is that geographical contexts can persist in spite of the ongoing 
changing of their physical properties, regardless of whether the identity of some 
of the entities that are part of them is thereby distroyed. Note, however, that this 
is a reductionist view of the identity of contexts over time, just as is the view of 
personal identity over time based on the psychological criterion it is modelled 
after. This means that it rejects the idea that geographical contexts are separately 
existing entities, as well as the idea that the identity of contexts is a further fact 
that does not just consist in the identity of objects they are made of. 
This position is able to explain why a major physical alteration of the context 
of a city during the last centuries (like for example that affecting the context of 
Paris from the thirteenth century to today) was not revealed as fatal to its 
persistence, even if the magnitude of the physical change may be bigger than that 
produced by a sudden relocation.10 
Another basis for modelling adequate criteria for the persistence of 
geographical contexts may be found in Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory. 
According to this view, “to be something later is to be its closest continuer”, where 
for y to be a continuer of x means that y’s properties are the same as x’s, resemble 
them, or at least grow out of them and are causally produced by them; for y to be 
the closest continuer of x means that y is closer to x than any other continuer; and 
closeness must be defined case by case by specifying which dimensions, or 
weighted sum of dimensions, determine it (Nozick 1981). Indeed, the closest 
continuer theory must be integrated by a theory of what closeness amounts to in 
the case of geographical contexts; and it is the latter theory, rather than the closest 
continuer theory itself, that would bear the burden of specifying the criteria of 
identity among contexts we look for. Thus Nozick’s closest continuer theory 
seems to be more a complement to a view of continuity under identity like that 
outlined above than one of its rivals. Furthermore note that, as conceded by 
Nozick in general, a context may be the closest continuer to the context of city T 
without being close enough to it to be the context of city T. In other words, being 
 
9 Indeed, Parfit distinguishes among a narrow view, which also requires that psychological 
continuity have the right kind of cause, and two wide versions, that allow any reliable 
cause, or any cause, respectively. The same distinction can be drawn with regard to persis-
tential continuity. 
10 We are aware it could be questioned that psychological continuity is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for personal identity over time. Firstly, it may not be a necessary con-
dition since apparently a temporary mental blackout briefly shutting down all psychologi-
cal connections would not be detrimental to the persistence of a person if followed by a 
restart of mental life in the very same configuration it possessed before. Secondly, it may 
not be a sufficient condition since some slow yet severe and irreversible kinds of psycho-
logical transformation (say, gradual and permanent demonic possession) may count as le-
thal to personal identity in spite of their being compatible with the holding of overlapping 
chains of strong psychological connectedness. Mutatis mutandis, the same worries could 
be raised with regards to persistential continuity as a necessary and sufficient condition for 
a city context identity over time. 
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the closest continuer of a certain context is at best only a necessary condition for 
being identical to that context. 
 
5. Can a City Ever Survive Relocation? 
One of the consequences of contextual essentialism is that some relocations of a city 
may not alter the city’s identity, provided that also the context is relocated (and, 
its identity survives the change). However, contextual essentialism is clearly also 
compatible with the fact that no city relocation is ever possible; in fact, it might 
turn out that no city context can ever be relocated. 
Consider that, on contextual essentialism, it is also possible that cities can 
survive some kinds of relocation also if cities contexts cannot ever survive any 
relocation. This is possible, for example, if we conceive geographical contexts as 
regions of space rather than complex (spatial) relations nets characterising single 
spots. In this situation, replacing a city inside its original geographical context, also if 
in a different position within it, would count as relocating it while preserving its 
context. In any case, as long as city contexts can be relocated, ceteris paribus also 
cities can be relocated. 
City contexts might turn out to be immovable for a number of different 
reasons. For one thing, it might be that (differently from cities) city contexts 
essentially hold the property of being located in the particular part of Earth’s 
surface they occupy. Or, suppose that they—just like cities—do have among their 
essential properties that of being surrounded by a specific broader geographical 
context. The position according to which a geographical context could only be 
relocated by relocating its broader geographical context may seem affected by an 
infinite regression; as a consequence, nothing could ever survive relocation that 
has some geographical contextual properties among its essential properties in the 
first place. 
We believe that the infinite regression problem can be solved. Note that the 
solution we provide allows holding that any geographical entity or region of 
space—regardless of how extended it is—has among its essential properties that 
of being surrounded by a specific broader geographical context. Consider first an 
architectural entity like a building. Suppose you maintain that among its essential 
properties there is the property of being surrounded by a specific material context; 
and, call this context the “urban context” of the building (supposing that the 
building rises up in a city). We want now to distinguish between the city the 
building rises up in, on one hand, and the building’s urban context, on the other 
hand. These are two different items admitting of different persistence conditions. 
In particular, relocating the urban context seems to us easier than relocating the 
city. In order to make the urban context survive relocation, you may only need to 
preserve its physical identity or even physical continuity. In other words, the 
urban context—differently from the city—does not seem to have among its 
essential properties that of being surrounded by a specific broader geographical 
context. So the church of Saint-Germain-des-Prés can only survive relocation if 
its “Parisian context” is preserved; but it is possible to hold that the persistence of 
this “Parisian context” tolerates relocation much better than Paris itself, so that 
relocating the church of Saint-Germain-des-Prés is not affected by the difficulty 
of relocating Paris in the first place. 
The same line of reasoning holds for larger items such as cities. Like the 
church of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, Paris is an essentially context-dependent item. 
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But when we distinguish among Paris’ geographical context, on one side, and the 
region of Île-de-France, on the other side, we are able to posit that only the latter 
is in turn characterised by having among its essential properties that of being 
surrounded by a specific broader geographical context. Then we can envisage 
moving the geographical context Paris is essentially dependent on without 
necessarily moving the region of Île-de-France. This makes Paris movable in spite 
of both Paris and the region of Île-de-France having among their essential 
properties the property of being surrounded by their own specific geographical 
context. There is no infinite regression. 
Regardless of whether we want to distinguish among a geographical region 
and the geographical context of an item (like a city) rising up in that region, of 
course, it is still possible that the infinite regression holds if also geographical 
contexts—like geographical regions—are revealed as being essentially context-
dependent. Moreover, also in case they are not so, and accordingly there is no 
infinite regression, city contexts might turn out to be incapable to survive 
relocation because of some other reason. 
One possibility is that a city context is immovable because of its being vague. 
If it is indeterminate whether one or more areas belong to the context, it might be 
impossible to determine where it exactly lies and hence what exactly has to be 
relocated. If the context’s boundaries can be fixed only arbitrarily, then it seems 
impossible to decide which of an infinite list of partially overlapping geographical 
contexts should be moved. To make matters worse, vagueness involves a 
pernicious puzzle, i.e. the sorites paradox. In fact, assuming that an area A1 
belongs to the city context C, arguably an area A2 adjacent to A1 belongs to C too. 
By induction, any area An belongs to C, included any area that may lie thousands 
of miles away from C. 
How can we solve this problem? Varzi (2001), following Russell (1923) and 
Lewis (1986), argues that vagueness in the geographical domain is semantic, not 
ontological. Namely vagueness is a feature of the terms by means of which we 
pick out geographical objects, rather than being a feature of the objects 
themselves. Thus, we can get around the problem by adopting an adequate 
semantic approach, like for example supervalutationism. The basic idea under a 
supervalutationistic semantics is that the name ‘context of city T’ is vague—i.e. 
there are some specific portions of Earth’s surfaces that neither determinately are 
nor determinately are not the context of city T, or equivalently, there are some 
areas that neither determinately belong nor determinately belong not to the 
context of city T—because the name ‘context of city T’ admits of many different 
legitimate referents. When we put in making the meaning of a vague name or 
predicate more precise, we accordingly have many legitimate ways of doing it. 
Each way of making a vague name or predicate more precise is a precisification. A 
precisification is admissible if and only if every sentence that is determinately true 
(false) in English is true (false) in the precisification (Weatherson 2016). 
Consider the statement B = “X belongs to the context of city T”. Call S the 
set of all the areas (or even parcels of land) A1, A2, …., An such that substituting X 
with each area Ai, B is true under every admissible precisification of the predicate 
‘belonging to the context of city T’ (or, equivalently, of the name ‘context of city 
T’). We call S the ‘minimal context of city T’. Then call S' the set of all areas A'1, 
A'2, …., A'n such that substituting X with each area A'i, B is true under some 
admissible precisifications of the predicate ‘belonging to the context of city T’, 
and false under others. We call ‘enlarged context of city T’ every area 
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mereologically composed by both S and at least one area that is a member of S'. 
We call the ‘maximal context of city T’ the biggest of the enlarged contexts of city 
T, that is, the one enlarged context of city T that includes all the members of S' as 
its proper parts. If you want to adopt a strict view of how vagueness must be 
contrasted, then what has to be moved in order to move the context of city T is 
the minimal context of city T. If you want to adopt a more liberal view, however, 
you can move any of the enlarged contexts of city T, included its maximal 
context. In any case vagueness is no longer a problem. In order to be able to 
relocate a city context, at worst you might have to previously pick it out from a 
set of equally good candidates—that is, just in case you adopt the liberal rather 
than the strict view. Note that each enlarged context seems to fully possess the 
status of being the geographical context of that particular city under the liberal 
view; and that apparently there is no difficulty for a city to have more than one 
geographical context. 
Vagueness may also make it arbitrary to distinguish between the city and its 
context in the first place. Also this difficulty—however less serious to contextual 
essentialism—can be treated using the same approach; first we can identify as city 
T the minimal city T or else any of the enlarged cities T, and then we can identify 
its context as specified above. 
 
6. Conclusions 
There is at least one notable difference among the metaphysical nature of cities, 
on one side, and that of ordinary objects and persons, on the other side. The 
identity of ordinary objects and persons over time is normally thought to be 
untouched by variations in location. Ordinary objects like chairs, apples and 
books can be moved without threatening their identity. Similarly, people are 
normally considered to be the same after they have travelled or when they move 
to another country, and we ordinarily accept that anyone can survive her 
permanently moving from Paris to Tokyo if no particular accident occurs. By 
contrast, cities are not thought to normally survive relocation. Like architectural 
and geographical entities, site-specific works of art, location-specific food 
products, specific culinary works and nano-objects, cities seem to be very 
vulnerable to relocation. 
We have advanced a view accounting for this fact, called ‘contextual 
essentialism’, according to which cities do have among their essential properties 
the extrinsic property of being surrounded by a specific geographical context. 
Cities turn out to be essentially relational, context-dependent items. We have 
shown how contextual essentialism is a better account of the metaphysics of cities 
than its main rival, i.e. locative essentialism. We have concluded that a necessary 
condition for a city to persist over time is the persisting over time of its context; 
and we have outlined a view of a city context’s identity which is capable of 
explaining why some major physical alteration of the context of a city, such as 
that affecting the context of Paris from the thirteenth century to today, was not 
revealed as fatal to its persistence, even if the magnitude of the physical change is 
probably bigger than that produced by a sudden relocation. 
If we are right, a city could be relocated in principle, since—as we have 
shown—there might be no metaphysical obstacle to moving a city context. In fact, 
geographical contexts—as distinguished from geographical regions—may not be 
essentially context-dependent in turn; and the difficulties normally due to 
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vagueness in the geographical domain can be solved by adopting a specific view 
of what vagueness is as well as an adequate semantic approach in order to dispel 
its fog. 
We are aware that essentialism is not particularly trendy today in 
metaphysics in any of its versions. We should be prepared, however, to 
acknowledge essential properties whenever the explanatory advantages exceed 
the costs.11  
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